Anthony Spay v. CVS Caremark Corp by unknown
2017 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
11-16-2017 
Anthony Spay v. CVS Caremark Corp 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017 
Recommended Citation 
"Anthony Spay v. CVS Caremark Corp" (2017). 2017 Decisions. 1083. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017/1083 
This November is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in 2017 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 
 
 
 
 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 15-3548 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, EX REL ANTHONY R. 
SPAY 
 
v. 
 
CVS CAREMARK CORPORATION; CAREMARK RX, 
LLC, f/k/a Caremark RX, Inc.;  
CAREMARK, LLC, f/k/a Caremark, Inc.; SILVERSCRIPT, 
LLC, f/k/a Silverscript Inc. 
 
     Anthony R. Spay, 
                            Appellant 
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 2-09-cv-04672) 
District Judge: Honorable Ronald L. Buckwalter 
_____________ 
 
Argued  
November 10, 2016 
____________ 
 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE, and RESTREPO, 
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: November 16, 2017) 
______________ 
 
2 
 
Ian P. Samson, Esq. 
Paul A. Traina, Esq. 
Jared W. Beilke, Esq.  
Engstrom Lipscomb & Lack 
100100 Santa Monica Boulevard 
12th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA 90067 
 
Marc S. Raspanti, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Michael A. Morse, Esq. 
Pamela C. Brecht, Esq. 
Pietragallow Gordon Alfano Bosick & Raspanti 
1818 Market Street 
Suite 3402 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
 
 Attorneys for Appellant 
 
 
. 
Enu Mainigi, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Craig D. Singer, Esq. 
Grant A. Geyerman, Esq. 
Williams & Connolly LLP 
725 Twelfth Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
 
 Attorneys for Appellees 
 
Joy P. Clairmont, Esq. 
Berger & Montague, P.C. 
1622 Locust Street 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
 
Jeffrey F. Keller, Esq. 
Kathleen R. Scanlan, Esq. 
Keller Grover LLP 
1965 Marker Street 
San Francisco, CA 94103 
 
Gordon Schnell, Esq. 
Constantine Cannon LLP 
335 Madison Avenue 
3 
 
9th Floor 
New York, NY 10017 
 
Claire M. Sylvia, Esq. 
Phillips & Cohen LLP 
100 The Embarcadero 
Suite 300 
San Francisco, CA 94105  
 
    Attorneys for Amicus Appellant  
 
 
 
 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
We are asked to consider the viability of two potential 
defenses to an alleged False Claims Act violation that arise in 
the context of the Medicare Part D Program: the government 
knowledge inference, which can defeat a finding of scienter in 
certain circumstances, and the element of materiality.1 The 
District Court relied upon the government knowledge 
inference doctrine in dismissing the claims. Although we 
disagree with the court’s reliance on that doctrine, we 
nevertheless affirm the court’s dismissal of this suit because 
the misrepresentations it is based upon were not material to the 
government’s decision to pay the underlying claims.  
 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
A. The Medicare Part D Program 
 
                                              
1 The False Claims Act, and the qui tam actions they give rise 
to, are explained in more detail below. 
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Part D of the Medicare program is a voluntary 
prescription drug benefit program that subsidizes the cost of 
prescription drugs and prescription drug insurance premiums 
for Medicare enrollees.2 The Part D program operates as a 
public-private partnership between the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) and government contractors. 
CMS contracts with private insurance companies called 
“Sponsors” that administer prescription drug plans. The 
Sponsors, in turn, subcontract with “first-tier entities,” such as 
Pharmacy Benefit Managers (“PBM”s), that provide 
administrative and healthcare services, including claims 
processing. PBMs then contract with the pharmacies that 
actually dispense prescription medications to Medicare 
enrollees. Defendant Caremark Rx LLC3 was one of the largest 
PBMs in the United States from 2006 to 2007. 
 
Unlike many other government healthcare programs, 
Medicare Part D is not a fee-for-service program, in which the 
healthcare provider is reimbursed for providing specific 
services. Instead, a Sponsor submits a bid in the year prior to 
the calendar year in which Part D benefits will actually be 
delivered, and CMS—after calculating average costs—
prospectively compensates Sponsors for their anticipated costs 
through regular monthly payments.4 At the end of the year, 
CMS undertakes a reconciliation process, wherein it compares 
actual costs to payments made to Sponsors during the past 
calendar year.5 This suit stems from plaintiffs’ claim that 
Sponsors intentionally submitted false information about their 
costs during the reconciliation process. According to plaintiffs, 
this false information resulted in CMS paying Sponsors more 
than they were actually entitled to during the reconciliation. 
                                              
2 The Medicare Part D program was enacted as part of the 
Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 and began on January 1, 
2006. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-101(a)(2). 
3 “On March 22, 2007, Caremark Rx LLC merged with CVS 
Corporation to form Defendant CVS Caremark Corporation. 
The Defendants are various subsidiaries of Defendant CVS 
Caremark Corporation.” U.S. ex rel. Spay v. CVS Caremark 
Corp., No. 09-4672, 2015 WL 5582553, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 
22, 2015). 
4 42 C.F.R. §§ 423.265, 315. 
5 42 C.F.R. § 423.343. 
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1. Part D Claims Processing 
 
Processing payments and claims under Medicare Part D 
involves (1) the pharmacy claim, which the pharmacy submits 
to its PBM, and (2) the Prescription Drug Event (“PDE”) 
record, which the Sponsor submits to CMS. 
 
Before a pharmacy dispenses drugs to a Medicare 
recipient, it first submits an electronic pharmacy claim to the 
recipient’s Part D Sponsor (or the Sponsor’s agent). The 
pharmacy claim contains information about the patient and the 
patient’s prescription. If the pharmacy claim is accepted, the 
PBM transmits its approval to the pharmacy, and the drug is 
dispensed to the Medicare recipient. If the pharmacy claim is 
rejected, the PBM sends the pharmacy a “Reject Code” that 
explains why it was rejected. Once the pharmacy claim is 
approved and the medication dispensed, the Sponsor 
reimburses the pharmacy for the cost of the prescription, minus 
the amount of any copay that the pharmacy may have received 
from the Medicare recipient. This process is called the claims 
“adjudication.” Although it sounds rather laborious and time-
consuming, modern technology allows the adjudication to 
occur in real-time, and PBMs typically inform pharmacies 
whether a claim has been approved or rejected within 
seconds—while the Medicare recipient waits at the pharmacy 
counter. 
 
Additionally, throughout the year, Sponsors submit 
PDE records to CMS for all prescriptions dispensed to 
Medicare recipients under Part D. Sponsors often submit those 
records to CMS through PBMs that act as the Sponsor’s agent. 
These PDE records are created electronically. They consist of 
summary extracts that include at least 34 mandated data fields 
about each prescription that was filled and the drug that was 
dispensed. Sponsors are required to give CMS a PDE for all of 
the prescriptions dispensed to a Part D Medicare recipient.6 
From 2006 to 2007, the PDEs were only used for the end-of-
year reconciliation. This dispute focuses on two of the 34 data 
                                              
6 Medicare Program; Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit, 70 
Fed. Reg. 4194, 4307 (Jan. 28, 2005) (to be codified at 42 
C.F.R. pt. 423). 
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fields on the PDEs: the Prescriber ID and the Prescriber ID 
Qualifier. 
 
The Prescriber ID was a unique number issued to an 
individual with prescribing authority such as a physician, 
dentist, or nurse practitioner. The PDE’s layout allowed for 
entry of any of four compatible sources of a Prescriber ID: (1) 
a National Provider Identifier (“NPI”);7 (2) a Universal 
Provider Identification Number (“UPIN”); (3) a state license 
number; or (4) a Drug Enforcement Agency number. The 
Prescriber ID Qualifier specified which of these four types of 
numbers was being submitted. The automated system that 
CMS used to process the PDEs would reject any PDE with a 
blank Prescriber ID or blank Prescriber ID Qualifier field. As 
a result, the dispensing pharmacy would not be paid for the 
corresponding prescription. 
 
2. Dummy Prescriber IDs 
 
In March 2006, Caremark employees identified 
approximately 4,500 PDEs that had been authorized for 
payment by Caremark, but not yet submitted to CMS, that had 
“errored out” due to the lack of a compatible Prescriber ID.8 In 
an attempt to resolve the problem, Caremark used a dummy 
Prescriber ID (AA0000000) for all of the corresponding data 
fields on each of those 4,500 PDEs. Caremark then 
programmed that dummy Prescriber ID into its computer 
system. Thereafter, when any claim with a missing or 
incorrectly formatted Prescriber ID was processed, the system 
would default to the dummy Prescriber ID, which the computer 
would enter into the appropriate data field. This allowed 
Caremark to submit for payment PDEs that would have 
otherwise had missing or incorrectly formatted Prescriber IDs, 
without trigging CMS error codes that would have resulted 
from an incorrect, or nonconforming, value in the Prescriber 
ID data field. Caremark later began to use additional dummy 
Prescriber IDs, all of which served the same purpose. In 2006–
                                              
7 “In 2006–2007, few prescribers used the NPI since there 
was no universal form of Prescriber ID issued to all 
prescribers in the United States.” Spay, 2015 WL 5582553, at 
*8. 
8 Spay, 2015 WL 5582553, at *15. 
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2007, Caremark generated PDE records containing 56 different 
dummy Prescriber IDs, none of which identified the actual 
prescriber, or corresponded to anyone with actual prescribing 
authority. 
 
B. Procedural History 
 
Appellant Relator Spay is a former pharmacist and co-
founder of a company that audits pharmacies. In 2007, during 
an audit of one of Caremark’s9 insurance company clients, 
Spay identified six categories of alleged discrepancies in 
Caremark’s pharmacy claims processing. One of these 
categories was the use of “dummy” Prescriber IDs. After 
discussion with Caremark, its client dropped all six issues 
identified in the audit, collected no recovery from Caremark, 
and did not pay Spay for the audit. 
 
In 2009, Spay filed this qui tam10 lawsuit based on those 
same six audit issues. Spay’s claims included an allegation that 
Caremark populated the Prescriber ID field on a large number 
of its PDE records with a dummy identifier and then falsely 
certified the accuracy of the PDEs. Spay alleged this 
constituted a violation of the False Claims Act (“FCA”), 
because those inaccurate PDEs were used to support requests 
for reimbursement for prescriptions that had been filled for 
                                              
9 In 2006-2007, Caremark served as a PBM for 39 different 
Part B Sponsors.  
10 “Qui tam is short for the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino 
rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, which means 
‘who pursues this action on our Lord the King's behalf as well 
as his own.’” Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 
529 U.S. 765, 768 n.1 (2000) (citation omitted). A qui tam 
lawsuit is a private enforcement action under the False Claims 
Act where the private party bringing the suit referred to as the 
“relator.” U.S. ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of N.Y., 556 U.S. 928, 
932 (2009) (citation omitted). 
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Medicare recipients at various pharmacies.11 The government 
declined to intervene in the suit.12 
 
The District Court denied Caremark’s subsequent 
motion to dismiss, and granted Caremark’s motion for 
summary judgment in its entirety.13 In reviewing the dummy 
Prescriber ID claim, the court concluded that Caremark had 
established sufficient government knowledge to preclude 
finding the required element of scienter.14 In arriving at this 
conclusion, the District Court first reviewed the law governing 
the “government knowledge inference” doctrine.15 The District 
Court noted that “at least six” circuit courts have adopted this 
doctrine.16 The court explained that doctrine as follows: “when 
the government knows and approves of the facts underlying an 
allegedly false claim prior to presentment, an inference arises 
that the claim was not knowingly submitted, regardless of 
whether the claim itself is actually false.”17 The District Court 
                                              
11 Specifically, Spay alleged that Caremark failed to comply 
with 42 C.F.R. § 423.505(k), which requires, as a condition 
for payment, that Part D Sponsors certify the “accuracy, 
completeness, and truthfulness of all data related to 
payment.” 
12 “When a relator initiates [a qui tam] action, the United 
States is given 60 days to review the claim and decide 
whether it will ‘elect to intervene and proceed with the 
action.’” Eisenstein, 556 U.S. at 932 (quoting 31 U.S.C. §§ 
3730(b)(2), (b)(4)).  
13 Spay also moved for partial summary judgment, which was 
denied in its entirety. 
14 The District Court did not address Caremark’s additional 
arguments for why Spay’s dummy Prescriber ID claim failed: 
(1) the dummy Prescriber IDs were not deceptive and, 
therefore, not “false;” (2) Spay could not prove the 
“knowledge” element; and (3) Caremark did not make a false 
certification. Spay, 2015 WL 5582553, at *23. 
15 Id. at *23–*25. 
16 Id. at *24. 
17 Id. (citing U.S. ex rel. Burlbaw v. Orenduff, 548 F.3d 931, 
951 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Southland Mgmt. 
Corp., 326 F.3d 669, 683-84 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (Jones, 
J., concurring); U.S. ex rel. Becker v. Westinghouse Savannah 
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then pointed out that, although this Court has not yet addressed 
the government knowledge inference doctrine, several district 
courts both within the Third Circuit18 and outside the Third 
Circuit19 had dismissed FCA claims on the basis of the 
government knowledge inference. Based on “the consistency 
in the federal case law, and the absence of any jurisprudence 
suggesting that the government knowledge inference should 
not be used,” the District Court relied on that doctrine to 
dismiss the complaint.20 
 
The District Court concluded that (1) CMS knew about 
the use of dummy Prescriber IDs; (2) it paid all of the claims 
submitted on PDEs containing dummy Prescriber IDs anyway; 
and (3) it has never sought repayment from Caremark for any 
of those claims.21 Accordingly, the District Court reasoned that 
“no jury could reasonably find that the Defendants acted with 
the requisite scienter of falsely submitting a claim,” and 
granted summary judgment.22 This appeal followed. 
 
                                              
River Co., 305 F.3d 284, 289 (4th Cir. 2002); U.S. ex rel. 
Durcholz v. FKW Inc., 189 F.3d 542, 544-45 (7th Cir. 1999); 
U.S. ex rel. Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Techs. Corp., 
985 F.2d 1148, 1157 (2d Cir. 1993); U.S. ex rel. Hagood v. 
Sonoma Cty. Water Agency, 929 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 
1991)). 
18 Id. (citing United States v. Educ. Mgmt. LLC, No. 2:07-cv-
00461, 2013 WL 3854458, at *11 (W.D. Pa. May 14, 2013); 
U.S. Dep’t of Transp. ex rel. Arnold v. CMC Eng’g Inc., 947 
F. Supp. 2d 537, 545 (W.D. Pa. 2013), aff’d, 567 F. App’x 
166 (3d Cir. 2014); U.S. ex rel. Watson v. Conn. Gen. Life. 
Ins. Co., No. Civ.A.98-6698, 2003 WL 303142, at *8 (E.D. 
Pa. Feb. 11, 2003)). 
19 Id. (citing S.F. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. v. Spencer, 
No. C 04-4632, 2007 WL 1450350, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 
2007); Boisjoly v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 795, 
809 (D. Utah 1998); U.S. ex rel. Lamers v. City of Green Bay, 
998 F. Supp. 971, 988 (E.D. Wisc. 1998)). 
20 Id. at *25. 
21 Id. at *44. 
22 Id. 
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Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund (“TAFEF”), 
a nonprofit organization “dedicated to combating fraud against 
the government and protecting public resources through 
public-private partnerships” and “committed to preserving 
effective anti-fraud legislation at the federal and state levels;”23 
and Senator Charles E. Grassley, “the leading sponsor of the 
1986 and 2009 amendments” to the FCA, filed amicus briefs 
in support of Spay’s claims and arguing against the continued 
viability of the government knowledge inference.24  
 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction over Spay’s FCA 
claims under 31 U.S.C. § 3732(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We review an 
order granting summary judgment de novo, applying the same 
test the district court employed.”25 Summary judgment is 
appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”26 “We must view the record and 
draw inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving 
party.”27 We can affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment on any basis supported by the record.28 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
“The False Claims Act was adopted in 1863 and signed 
into law by President Abraham Lincoln in order to combat 
                                              
23 TAFEF Br. 1. Caremark notes that Spay’s counsel is a 
major donor to TAFEF and sits on its Advisory Board. 
Appellees’ Br. 43. 
24 Grassley Br. 2. 
25 In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc., 277 F.3d 658, 665 (3d Cir. 
2002). 
26 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
27 Knopick v. Connelly, 639 F.3d 600, 606 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
28 Fairview Twp. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 773 F.3d 517, 
525 n.15 (3d Cir. 1985). 
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rampant fraud in Civil War defense contracts.”29 The frauds 
included the government paying for artillery shells filled with 
sawdust instead of explosives,30 uniforms made of “shredded, 
often decaying rags, pressed . . . into a semblance of cloth” that 
“would fall apart in the first rain,”31 and the same horses being 
sold “two and three times to the Union cavalry.”32 Congress 
hoped that enacting the FCA would combat these dishonest 
government contractors, who had become “bands of 
conspirators . . . knotted together . . . for the purpose of 
defrauding and plundering the Government.”33 
 
The FCA’s qui tam provision allows individuals to 
bring claims on behalf of the government, and rewards 
successful plaintiffs with potentially very substantial 
recoveries. Though the precise awards to qui tam plaintiffs 
have changed since the statute’s inception, the current iteration 
of the False Claims Act imposes civil penalties and treble 
damages on defendants who submit false or fraudulent claims 
to the government. Individual relators can receive between 
15% and 30% of those swollen recoveries.34 Because the 
                                              
29 Kellogg Brown & Root Sers., Inc. v. U.S., ex rel. Carter, 
135 S. Ct. 1970, 1973 (2015) (quoting S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 
8 (1986), 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5273). See also Act of 
Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (1863). 
30 Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 955 (1863) (statement of 
Sen. Howard). 
31 Ron Soodalter, The Union’s ‘Shoddy’ Aristocracy, N.Y. 
Times Opinionator (May 9, 2011, 9:30 PM), 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/09/the-unions-
shoddy-aristocracy. See also James B. Helmer, Jr., False 
Claims Act: Incentivizing Integrity for 150 Years for Rogues, 
Privateers, Parasites and Patriots, 81 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1261, 
1264–65 (2013) (listing reports of misappropriated war funds 
and collecting sources). 
32 132 Cong. Rec. H6482 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1986) (statement 
of Rep. Berman). 
33 Cong. Globe, 37th Cong, 3d Sess. 955 (1863) (statement of 
Sen. Howard). 
34 31 U.S.C. §§ 3730(d)(1)–(2) (outlining the award to a qui 
tam plaintiff to be “at least 15 percent but not more than 25 
percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of the 
12 
 
statutory scheme of the FCA offers the potential for very 
lucrative damages, individuals have long attempted to take 
advantage of the potential for substantial awards, 35 and 
Congress has repeatedly amended the statute in response to 
past abuses.36 
 
For example, because the original FCA did not prohibit 
relators from bringing qui tam actions even when the 
government prosecuted the identical fraud, Congress enacted a 
government knowledge bar in 1943.37 This bar prohibited “qui 
                                              
claim” when the Government intervenes and “not less than 25 
percent and not more than 30 percent” when the Government 
does not intervene); 3729(a)(1) (providing for treble damages 
and civil monetary penalties for FCA claims). Under the 
original FCA, individuals bringing qui tam suits were entitled 
to half of the government’s recovery. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 
67, 12 Stat. 696, § 6 (1863). 
35 See U.S. ex rel. Jamison v. McKesson Corp., 649 F.3d 322, 
332 (5th Cir. 2011) (explaining that court’s holding would 
prevent qui tam relators from “arbitrarily select[ing] a large 
group of defendants in any industry in which public 
disclosures have revealed significant fraud, in hopes that 
[their] allegations will prove true for at least a few 
defendants”); James F. Barger, Jr., Pamela H. Bucy, Melinda 
M. Eubanks, Marc S. Raspanti, States, Statutes, and Fraud: 
An Empirical Study of Emerging State False Claims Acts, 42 
False Cl. Act and Qui Tam Q. Rev. 15 (2006) (“Because the 
FCA’s damages and penalty provisions tend to generate 
exceptionally large judgments, relators’ taxable recoveries 
involve substantial sums.”). 
36 See Graham Cty. Soil and Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. 
ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 310 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting) (citing S. Rep. No. 99–345, at 10–11) (“To be 
sure, Congress was also concerned in 1986, as in 1943, with 
guarding against purely opportunistic, ‘parasitic’ qui tam 
relators.”). 
37 145 Cong. Rec. E1546-01 (daily ed. July 14, 1999) 
(statement of Rep. Berman). The government knowledge bar 
was a response to the Supreme Court’s decision in U.S. ex rel. 
Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943), where the Court 
“upheld the relator’s recovery even though he had discovered 
13 
 
tam suits based on information already in the Government’s 
possession” in an attempt to deter “parasitic suits” that allowed 
relators to recover even if they “contributed nothing to the 
discovery of this crime.”38 As we explained in United States ex 
rel. Cantekin v. University of Pittsburgh: 
 
The implicit logic of the [government knowledge 
bar] was that if the government had the relevant 
information before the plaintiff initiated suit, 
then the government must be aware of the false 
claims and didn’t need the assistance of private 
parties to ferret them out. And if the government 
knew about the information yet did nothing, then 
the government probably thought the suit 
meritless, and any private action was apt to be 
spurious, driven only by the lure of the Act’s 
sizable damages.39 
 
Although the government knowledge bar merely 
attempted to curb bogus FCA suits, the limitation it created 
undermined the Act’s usefulness.40 It so “significantly limited 
the number of FCA cases that were filed” that “[b]y the 1980s, 
the FCA was no longer a viable tool for combating fraud 
against the Government.”41 In response, in 1986, Congress 
amended the FCA yet again, “specifically overturned the 
Government knowledge bar . . . and replaced it with a new 
                                              
the fraud by reading a federal criminal indictment—a 
quintessential ‘parasitic’ suit.” Graham Cty., 559 U.S. at 294. 
38 Id. (quoting Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. at 545). The pre-
1986 version of the FCA barred jurisdiction over any claim 
“whenever it shall be made to appear that such suit was based 
upon evidence or information in the possession of the United 
States, or any agency, officer, or employee thereof, at the 
time such suit was brought.” 31 U.S.C. § 232(C) (1943). 
39 192 F.3d 402, 408 (3d Cir. 1999), superseded by statute, 
FERA, Pub. L. No. 111-21, as recognized in U.S. ex rel. Hill 
v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 448 F. App’x 314, 317 
n.4 (3d Cir. 2011). 
40 See id. 
41 S. Rep. No. 110-507, at 3 (2008). 
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mechanism referred to as a ‘public disclosure bar.’”42 The 
public disclosure bar was enacted “in an effort to strike a 
balance between encouraging private persons to root out fraud 
and stifling parasitic lawsuits.”43 Under this new standard, a 
qui tam suit would only be barred if it was based on 
information that was “publicly disclosed at various hearings, 
in certain types of reports, or by the media.”44 “Once public 
disclosure became the linchpin of the jurisdictional scheme, the 
effect of government knowledge on the viability of an FCA 
claim was thrown to the courts to decide.”45 
 
Meanwhile, courts were inquiring into whether the FCA 
included a materiality element requiring any alleged 
falsehoods to be material to the government’s decision to pay, 
and what the proper standard for measuring materiality might 
be.46 Though “nearly every court to have considered the issue 
[of materiality] had imposed such a requirement,” courts “did 
not agree on what the standard for materiality was.”47 In 2009, 
Congress passed the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act, 
which again amended the FCA and provided a uniform 
definition of materiality.48 As explained in the corresponding 
Senate Report, these amendments “corrected and clarified” 
certain FCA provisions, the effectiveness of which had 
                                              
42 Id. at 5. 
43 Graham Cty., 559 U.S. at 295. 
44 Cantekin, 192 F.3d at 408 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (1994)). The 
public disclosure must have occurred “in a criminal, civil, or 
administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or 
Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or 
investigation, or from the news media . . .” 31 U.S.C. § 
3730(e)(4)(A) (1994). 
45 Lamers, 998 F. Supp. at 988 (citing U.S. ex rel. Butler v. 
Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 71 F.3d 321, 326 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
46 See James B. Helmer, False Claims Act: Whistleblower 
Litigation 247–48 n.873 (6th ed.) (2012) (cataloguing pre-
2008 circuit cases imposing materiality requirement).  
47 See id. at 248 (discussing circuit split on materiality 
standard). 
48 Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA), 
Pub. L. No. 111-21 (2009). 
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“recently been undermined by court decisions which limit the 
scope of the law and, in some cases, allow subcontractors paid 
with Government money to escape responsibility for proven 
frauds.”49 
With this background in mind, we will first address 
Spay’s argument that the District Court’s decision here created 
“an unprecedented ‘industry practice’ government knowledge 
inference that undermines the purpose of the FCA.”50 We will 
then more generally address the issue of materiality under the 
FCA. 
 
A. Government Knowledge Inference. 
 
Though we have never recognized a “government 
knowledge inference” defense that would defeat the scienter 
requirement under the FCA, the District Court quite correctly 
noted that six of our sister circuit courts of appeals have.51 Just 
as the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit did before us, 
“[t]oday, we join with our sister circuits and hold that the 
government’s knowledge of the facts underlying an allegedly 
false record or statement can negate the scienter required for 
an FCA violation.”52 
 
While the government knowledge bar that Congress 
overturned in 1986 (in favor of the public disclosure bar) 
“focused on the government’s knowledge of the fraud to 
preclude the relator from bringing suit,” the current 
government knowledge inference “focuses on the effect the 
government’s knowledge has on the defendant’s mental state 
                                              
49 S. Rep. No. 111-10, at 4 (2009). The Report later clarifies 
that the amendments were meant to “clarify and correct 
erroneous interpretations of the law that were decided in 
Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 128 S. Ct. 
2123 (2008) and United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombadier 
Corp., 380 F.3d 488 (D.C. Cir. 2004).” Id. at *10. 
50 Appellant’s Br. 15. 
51 Arnold, 567 F. App’x at 170 n.9 (explaining that the Third 
Circuit had not yet adopted the government knowledge 
inference in 2014); Spay, 2015 WL 5582553, at *24 
(collecting circuit cases). 
52 Becker, 305 F.3d at 289. 
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in order to determine if the defendant acted knowingly.”53 “The 
‘government knowledge inference’ helps distinguish, in FCA 
cases, between the submission of a false claim and the knowing 
submission of a false claim—that is, between the presence and 
absence of scienter.”54 The government knowledge inference 
may arise “when the government knows and approves of the 
facts underlying an allegedly false claim prior to 
presentment”55 and the defendant knows that the government 
is aware of the false information in a claim. In other words, 
there is a two-prong test that must be met before the 
government knowledge inference can preclude liability. The 
two-prong test requires that (1) the government agency knew 
about the alleged false statement(s), and (2) the defendant 
knew the government knew.56 
 
A “classic example” of the government knowledge 
inference occurs “when the government, with knowledge of the 
facts underlying an allegedly false claim, authorizes a 
contractor to make that claim.”57 For instance, in United States 
ex rel. Durcholz v. FKW, Inc.,58 officers at a naval facility 
directed the defendant general contractor to use incorrect line-
items in order to expedite the bidding process. The officers did 
so because “[they] were more interested in speed than cost and 
made their decisions in accordance with these priorities.”59 The 
                                              
53 Michael J. Davidson, The Government Knowledge Defense 
to the Civil False Claims Act: A Misnomer by Any Other 
Name Does Not Sound as Sweet, 45 Idaho L. Rev. 41, 47 
(2008) (citations omitted). 
54 Burlbaw, 548 F.3d at 951. 
55 Id. at 952. 
56 See Educ. Mgmt., 2013 WL 3854458, at *11; Southland 
Mgmt. Corp., 326 F.3d at 682 (Jones, J., concurring) (“Most 
of our sister circuits have held that under some circumstances, 
the government’s knowledge of the falsity of a statement or 
claim can defeat FCA liability on the ground that the claimant 
did not act ‘knowingly’, because the claimant knew that the 
government knew of the falsity of the statement and was 
willing to pay anyway.”). 
57 Burlbaw, 548 F.3d at 952 (citing Wang, 975 F.2d at 1421). 
58 189 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 1999). 
59 Id. at 545. 
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Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit “decline[d] to hold 
[the defendant] liable for defrauding the government by 
following the government’s explicit directions.”60 The court 
explained that “[t]he government knew what it wanted, and it 
got what it paid for.”61 Though such direct and contract-
specific authorization is not required to support the 
government knowledge inference,62 generally, “[w]here the 
government and a contractor have been working together, 
albeit outside the written provisions of the contract, to reach a 
common solution to a problem, no claim arises.”63 In other 
words, the easy case in which to apply the government 
knowledge inference is where the defendant and the 
government engage in open and ongoing discussions about the 
purportedly false claims.64 This is the “easy case” because both 
prongs are easily met. 
                                              
60 Id. 
61 Id.; see also Becker, 305 F.3d at 289 (applying government 
knowledge inference where the Department of Energy’s “full 
knowledge of the material facts underlying any 
representations implicit in [the defendant’s] conduct negates 
any knowledge that [the defendant] had regarding the truth or 
falsity of those representations”). 
62 See Burlbaw, 548 F.3d at 953 (applying the government 
knowledge inference where there was evidence of 
governmental knowledge and cooperation, the defendant was 
“completely forthcoming” with the government, and there 
was no evidence that the information the defendant provided 
was “materially inaccurate”). 
63 Southland, 326 F.3d at 682 (Jones, J., concurring). 
64 See, e.g., Wang ex rel. United States v. FMC Corp., 975 
F.2d 1412, 1421 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The government knew of 
all the deficiencies identified by [the relator], and discussed 
them with [the defendant]. The fact that the government knew 
of [the defendant’s] mistake and limitations, and that [the 
defendant] was open with the government about them, 
suggests that while [the defendant] may have been groping 
for solutions, it was not cheating the government in the effort. 
Without more, the common failings of engineers and other 
scientists are not culpable under the [FCA].”), overruled on 
other grounds by U.S. ex rel. Hartpence v. Kinetic Concepts, 
792 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2015); Butler, 71 F.3d at 327 (finding 
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A two-prong test is necessary because knowledge by the 
government, without more, cannot negate the scienter 
requirement. This is so, as noted above, because the elements 
of the FCA claim focus on the defendant’s state of mind. An 
examination of the cases where government knowledge has not 
barred recovery drives home that merely showing some 
government knowledge of the alleged false nature of a claim is 
not enough.  
 
In Shaw v. AAA Engineering & Drafting, Inc.,65 the 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit distinguished the 
decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 
United States ex rel. Butler v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc.66 and 
Wang ex rel. United States v. FMC Corp.67 The Tenth Circuit 
stressed that in Butler and Wang, the defendants and 
government had “completely cooperated and shared all 
information”68 and “had an ongoing dialogue . . . about the 
problems.”69 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that, although there 
was evidence of government knowledge in Shaw, the 
knowledge was not sufficient to “negate the intent requirement 
under the FCA as a matter of law.”70 In Shaw, the evidence 
showed that (1) the plaintiff relator, and not the defendant 
government photography contractor, told the government 
about a failure to use the required film processing method;71 
                                              
the government’s knowledge of allegedly false claims 
negated defendant’s intent where “the only reasonable 
conclusion a jury could draw from the evidence was that [the 
defendant] and the Army had so completely cooperated and 
shared all information . . . that [the defendant] did not 
‘knowingly’ submit false claims”). 
65 213 F.3d 519 (10th Cir. 2000). 
66 71 F.3d 321. 
67 975 F.2d 1412. 
68 Shaw, 213 F.3d at 534 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Butler, 
71 F.3d at 327). 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 In Shaw, the defendant government photography contractor 
was required to provide equipment necessary for silver 
recovery—a “process by which trace silver is removed from 
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(2) the defendant was “not forthcoming” about the alleged 
falsity and “repeatedly evaded government employees’ 
questions on the subject;” (3) there was support for the 
inference that the defendants did include false information on 
some work orders; and (4) several government employees were 
not aware of that false information.72 Other circuit courts of 
appeals have also repeatedly stressed “[t]hat the relevant 
government officials know of the falsity is not in itself a 
defense.”73 
 
Thus, it appears the government knowledge inference 
might be more aptly named a “government acquiescence 
inference,” as knowledge alone on the part of the government 
is insufficient to establish an FCA defense. To reiterate, there 
are two prongs to this defense: (1) the government knew about 
the alleged false statement(s), and (2) the defendant knew that 
the government knew. This case presents an example where, 
though there is ample evidence of government knowledge of 
the industry practice at issue, the evidence to satisfy the second 
prong is lacking.  
 
                                              
film processing solution”—and to “dispose of the used 
[solution] and other chemicals in accordance with 
Environmental Protection Agency . . . guidelines and 
standards.” Id. at 527. The plaintiff relator alleged that the 
contractor failed to do so. Id. at 523. 
72 Id. at 534–35. 
73 Kreindler, 985 F.2d at 1156 (quoting Hagood, 929 F.2d at 
1421); see also U.S. ex rel. A+ Homecare, Inc. v. Medshares 
Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 400 F.3d 428, 454 n.21 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(explaining that the government knowledge inference is 
typically applied where “the Government’s knowledge was 
used to demonstrate that what the defendant submitted was 
not actually false but rather conformed to a modified 
agreement with the Government,” and that, because the 
defendant had neither altered the Government’s 
understanding of reimbursement nor disclosed all pertinent 
information, that inference was not available in this case), 
superseded by statute, FERA, Pub. L. No. 111-21 (2009), as 
recognized in U.S. ex rel. Harper v. Muskingum Watershed 
Conservancy Dist., 842 F.3d 430, 436 (6th Cir. 2016). 
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B. The Government Knowledge Inference Does Not Apply 
Here. 
 
Spay alleges that Caremark’s false certifications 
violated three sections of the pre-2009 FCA.74 Those sections 
prohibit (1) “knowingly present[ing] . . . a false or fraudulent 
claim for payment or approval” to the government;75 (2) 
“knowingly mak[ing] . . . a false record or statement to get a 
false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the 
Government;”76 and (3) “knowingly mak[ing] . . . a false record 
or statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay 
. . . the Government.”77 The FCA defines “knowingly” to mean 
that a person “(1) has actual knowledge of the information; (2) 
acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the 
information; or (3) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or 
falsity of the information.”78 However, “no proof of specific 
intent to defraud is required.”79 
 
The District Court exhaustively reviewed the evidence 
in this case and concluded that it was clear that CMS knew of, 
and accepted, the industry-wide practice of using dummy 
Prescriber IDs on PDE records. The court explained: 
 
[T]he evidence is clear that (a) CMS officials 
knew, in 2006–2007, that Sponsors and PBMs 
were having trouble obtaining the unique 
physician identifier number necessary to 
populate the associated field on the PDE; (b) 
CMS prioritized the filling of valid pharmacy 
                                              
74 As we explained at the outset, the False Claims Act was 
amended in 2009. Those amendments were deemed to “take 
effect on the date of enactment of this Act [May 20, 2009] 
and shall apply to conduct on or after the date of enactment.” 
Pub. L. 111-21 at § 4(f). Because the alleged conduct in this 
case occurred before 2009, we will use the pre-2009 version 
of the FCA to assess the claims here, just as the District Court 
did. 2015 WL 5582553, at *21 n.10. 
75 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (1994). 
76 Id. at § 3729(a)(2). 
77 Id. at § 3729(a)(7). 
78 Id. at § 3729(b)(1)–(3). 
79 Id. at § 3729(b). 
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claims over the administrative requirement of 
populating the physician identifier field and did 
not want valid claims rejected due to the absence 
of that number; (c) CMS knew that, in order to 
submit PDEs for valid pharmacy claims, 
Sponsors and PBMs were submitting PDEs 
containing dummy prescriber identifiers, yet 
never sanctioned any Sponsor, terminated any 
Sponsor, or required the submission of any PDE 
from 2006 or 2007 as a result of this practice; (d) 
although CMS preferred the use of a unique 
identifier, CMS affirmatively instructed 
Sponsors and PBMs to submit dummy prescriber 
IDs when a unique number was not available; (e) 
only after the 2006–2007 time frame did CMS 
issue affirmative instructions mandating the use 
of a unique identifier; (f) Defendants understood 
that CMS permitted the use of dummy prescriber 
IDs in 2006–2007; and (g) Defendants’ 
certifications of the accuracy of the data were 
filed during the period when CMS clearly knew 
of dummy prescriber usage.80 
 
The record clearly supports these conclusions.81 It is 
therefore clear that CMS knew that many Sponsors and PBMs 
were using dummy Prescriber IDs on PDE records so that those 
records would not be rejected in the approval process. 
Accordingly, Caremark has adduced evidence to establish the 
first prong of the government knowledge inference. 
                                              
80 Spay, 2015 WL 5582553, at *26. 
81 Spay and Sen. Grassley argue that the District Court 
incorrectly applied agency principles when relying on the 
statements of CMS employees who testified individually, but 
not on behalf of the government, to infer government 
knowledge. Appellant’s Br. at 28–39 (citing 2015 WL 
5582553, at *26 n.17); Grassley Br. at 21–24. As Caremark 
correctly points out, circuit courts routinely rely on 
government employee testimony as evidence of what relevant 
government officials knew about the alleged conduct in FCA 
cases, and do not require that the employee testify on behalf 
of the government. See, e.g., Huston v. Proctor & Gamble 
Paper Prods. Co., 568 F.3d 100 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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The evidence of Caremark’s knowledge that CMS knew 
of the dummy Prescriber IDs practice, however, is lacking. 
Caremark understood that CMS seemed to allow the use of 
dummy Prescriber IDs on the PDEs. But Joe Mulenex, 
Caremark’s manager responsible for PDE submission, did not 
recall any conversation where he or anyone else from 
Caremark asked CMS about inputting default Prescriber IDs. 
He was not aware of any written guidance from CMS regarding 
how to proceed in the absence of an actual Prescriber IDs. 
 
Our review of the record shows there is no evidence of 
the kind of cooperation and collaborative problem-solving that 
exists in the easy case where the government knowledge 
inference is invoked. While it is true that both the government 
and contractors throughout the industry knew what was 
happening, there is no evidence of any explicit approval from 
the government to Caremark of this temporary work-around. 
More importantly, this evidence of what was occurring in the 
industry does not establish that Caremark knew that CMS was 
aware of the practice of using dummy Prescriber IDs. Indeed 
the record shows that Caremark was simply hopeful that its use 
of the dummy IDs would be acceptable. Thus, the 
circumstances here are somewhat different than the usual case 
where the government knowledge inference has been applied. 
Drawing reasonable inferences in Spay’s favor, as we must, the 
evidence does not demonstrate Caremark’s knowledge for 
purposes of the second prong. We agree with Spay and the 
amici that the District Court erred in relying upon the 
government knowledge inference in dismissing these claims 
based on the dummy Prescriber IDs. 
 
There is one more point we must address. The District 
Court’s application of the government knowledge inference is 
premised, at least in part, on the incorrect assertion that “the 
crux of an FCA violation is intentionally deceiving the 
government. Where the government has not been deceived, no 
violation can exist.”82 The FCA itself, however, states “no 
proof of specific intent to defraud is required.”83 Though we 
                                              
82 2015 WL 5582553, at *43. 
83 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(B). 
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agree that there was no evidence of an intent to deceive the 
government here, Spay was not required to prove there was. 
In sum, the government knowledge inference is not 
applicable here because Caremark failed to establish the 
second prong of the two-prong test.84 
 
C. Materiality in the FCA Before 2009 
 
While this case was on appeal, the Supreme Court 
decided Universal Health Services, Inc. v. Escobar,85 which 
confirmed that materiality is an essential element of a False 
Claims Act violation that “descends from common law 
antecedents.”86 Spay correctly points out that the Universal 
Health decision dealt with the post-2009 version of the FCA, 
and the Court explicitly stated that it had not considered 
“whether pre-2009 conduct should be treated differently.”87 
The disputed conduct here all occurred before the 2009 
amendments were enacted. Accordingly, we must decide 
whether materiality was a requirement under the FCA prior to 
the 2009 FERA amendments.88 
                                              
84 The evidence in this case demonstrates that Caremark was 
stuck between a rock and a hard place at the inception of the 
Part D Program. Caremark hoped its approach of using 
dummy Prescriber IDs when they did not have the 
Prescriber’s actual ID—an approach which fit into the 
Prescriber ID validation algorithm—was a valid, non-
fraudulent PDE submission given the circumstances at that 
time that allowed it to be paid for prescriptions needed by 
Medicare clients. Thus, Caremark did not act with the scienter 
necessary for liability to attach under the FCA. 
85 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016). 
86 Id. at 2002 (citations omitted). 
87 Id. at 1998 n.1. 
88 The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, when similarly 
evaluating pre-2009 conduct, “assume[d]—as the parties have 
done—that Universal Health’s materiality standard applies to 
the instant dispute.” U.S. ex re. McBride v. Halliburton Co., 
848 F.3d 1027, 1031 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Here, Spay 
contends that Universal Health’s materiality standard does 
not apply to pre-2009 conduct, and we therefore address this 
question directly. 
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The impact of the 2009 amendments and the decision in 
Universal Health on the materiality element can best be 
understood by focusing on the three sections of the FCA at 
issue here: Sections 3729(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(7). As we noted 
above in summarizing Spay’s arguments, those three sections 
create liability for any person who: 
(a)(1) knowingly presents, or causes to be 
presented, to an officer or employee of the 
United States Government . . . a false or 
fraudulent claim for payment or approval; 
 
(a)(2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be 
made or used, a false record or statement to get a 
false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the 
Government; . . . . or 
 
(a)(7) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be 
made or used, a false record or statement to 
conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay 
or transmit money or property to the 
Government[.]89 
 
When Congress amended the FCA in 2009, it included 
a materiality requirement in two of the seven predicates for 
FCA liability, both of which are at issue here: Sections 
3729(a)(2) and (a)(7). Specifically, the amended Section 
3729(a)(2) now imposes liability on one who “knowingly 
makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or 
statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.”90 Similarly, 
Section 3729(a)(7) now imposes liability on a person who 
“knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false 
record or statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit 
                                              
89 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(1), (2), (7) (1994). In 2009, Congress 
renumbered these sections, so that Section 3729(a)(1) became 
Section 3729(a)(1)(A), Section 3729(a)(2) became Section 
3729(a)(1)(B), and Section 3729(a)(7) became Section 
3729(a)(1)(G). Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4. For clarity, we refer 
to these Sections in the text by their pre-2009 labels. 
90 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). 
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money or property to the Government . . . .”91 The 2009 FERA 
amendments did not, however, add an explicit materiality 
requirement to Section 3729(a)(1).92 As we discuss below, 
Universal Health dealt with an alleged violation of that 
section.93 The 2009 FERA amendments also added a provision 
defining “material” as “having a natural tendency to influence, 
or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money 
or property.”94 As the history of the materiality requirement 
demonstrates, these changes did not inject a new materiality 
standard into the FCA. Rather, the changes merely made 
explicit and consistent that which had previously been a 
judicially-imposed, and oftentimes conflicting, standard. 
 
By 2009, several circuit courts had already 
acknowledged the implicit materiality requirement in the 
FCA.95 Importantly, none of those cases limited the materiality 
                                              
91 31 U.S.C. §3729(a)(1)(G) (emphasis added). 
92 Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (1994) (“knowingly 
presents, or causes to be presented, to [the Government] a 
false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval”), with 31 
U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2009) (“knowingly presents, or 
causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for 
payment or approval”). 
93 136 S. Ct. at 2001, 2002, 2004 (discussing 31 U.S.C. § 
3729(a)(1)(A) as relevant provision). 
94 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4). 
95 U.S. ex rel. Loughren v. Unum Grp., 613 F.3d 300, 307 (1st 
Cir. 2010) (“We have long held that the FCA is subject to a 
judicially-imposed requirement that the allegedly false claim 
or statement be material.”); U.S. ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of 
Trustees of the Univ. of Al., 104 F.3d 1453, 1459 (4th Cir. 
1997) (“[W]e now make explicit that the current civil False 
Claims Act imposes a materiality requirement.”); U.S. ex rel. 
Longhi v. U.S., 575 F.3d 458, 468–70 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(discussing “proper standard for assessing the materiality of a 
false statement under the FCA’s civil-liability” provisions); 
United States v. Bourseau, 531 F.3d 1159, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 
2008) (holding “that the FCA includes a materiality 
requirement”); A+ Homecare, Inc., 400 F.3d at 442 
(concluding “that false statements or conduct must be 
material to the false or fraudulent claim to hold a person 
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requirement to the two sections amended in 2009. Indeed, the 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit noted that the 2009 
FERA amendments had not changed the FCA’s general 
requirement that a relator “prove falsity, materiality, and 
scienter.”96  
Although prior to Universal Health, we had never 
decided whether the FCA contained a materiality requirement, 
the Supreme Court’s analysis in Universal Health resolves any 
hesitation we may have otherwise had.97 In United States ex 
rel. Cantekin v. University of Pittsburgh, we declined to decide 
whether materiality was an element of the pre-2009 FCA.98 We 
there expressed doubt that the FCA included a materiality 
requirement based on a footnote in Neder v. United States, a 
Supreme Court case holding that there is a materiality 
requirement in the federal mail, wire, and bank fraud statutes.99 
We explained that the Neder Court noted that “the term ‘false 
statement,’ unlike ‘fraudulent statement,’ does not imply a 
materiality requirement.”100 Although we expressly refrained 
from deciding the issue, we did observe that “[g]iven that the 
False Claims Act prohibits merely making a knowingly false 
                                              
civilly liable under the FCA”); U.S. ex rel. Costner v. U.S., 
317 F.3d 883, 887 (8th Cir. 2003) (acknowledging that a 
materiality requirement exists but refraining from deciding 
“the precise contours of the materiality requirement”); 
Lamers, 168 F.3d at 1019; U.S. v. TDC Mgmt. Corp., Inc., 24 
F.3d 292, 298 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“To prevail under the False 
Claims Act, the government must prove either that [the 
defendant] actually knew it had omitted material information 
from its monthly progress reports or that it recklessly 
disregarded or deliberately ignored that possibility.”). 
96 Loughren, 613 F.3d at 306–07 n.7–8 (“We need not decide 
whether the FERA applies retroactively here because under 
either the former or amended version of Section 3729(a)(2), 
our analysis of Relator’s claims . . . will be the same.”). 
97 But see U.S. ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech Inc., 855 F.3d 
481, 492 (3d Cir. 2017) (joining “the many other federal 
courts that have recognized the heightened materiality 
standard after Universal Health Services.”). 
98 Cantekin, 192 F.3d at 415. 
99 527 U.S. 1, 25 (1999). 
100 Cantekin, 192 F.3d at 415. 
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claim and does not require a specific intent to defraud, perhaps 
Neder argues against a materiality requirement.”101 But the 
subsequent Supreme Court decision in Universal Health, and 
its reliance on Neder’s definition of materiality in interpreting 
how the FCA’s materiality requirement should be enforced, 
resolves the doubts that we previously entertained in 
Cantekin.102 Thus, contrary to the concerns expressed there, 
Universal Health clarified that Neder’s footnote did not 
suggest the absence of a materiality requirement in the FCA. 
 
Moreover, the real issue that divided the circuit courts 
before 2009 was not whether materiality was an element of a 
cause of action under the FCA. Rather, it was the proper 
standard for determining whether the falsity underlying such a 
claim was material.103 Thus, including a formal definition of 
“material” in the statutory text in 2009 was merely an attempt 
to resolve those disagreements, and nothing more should be 
read into it.104 It was not intended to add a new element to FCA 
claims.105 
                                              
101 Id. 
102 See Universal Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2002 (explaining that 
the FCA’s post-2009 statutory definition of materiality uses 
“language that we have employed to define materiality in 
other federal fraud statutes,” like the language in Neder). 
103 See Longhi, 575 F.3d at 470 (noting the circuit split 
between the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, which 
used the “natural tendency test” for materiality, and the 
Eighth Circuit, which used the “more restrictive ‘outcome 
materiality test’”). 
104 See id. (explaining that, with the 2009 FERA amendments, 
“Congress embraced the [materiality] test as stated by the 
Supreme Court and several courts of appeals”). 
105 The legislative history of the 2009 FERA also indicates 
that the original FCA included a materiality requirement, and 
that Congress enacted the amendments contained in the 
FERA to restore that original requirement. Indeed, the title of 
the FCA section of the FERA was “Clarifications to the False 
Claims Act to Reflect the Original Intent of the Law.” FERA, 
Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4. The Senate Report on the FERA 
explains that the 2009 amendments were enacted in response 
to certain Supreme Court decisions that “r[an] contrary to the 
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Finally, although the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Universal Health addressed only post-2009 conduct, it 
nevertheless informs our analysis of conduct that occurred 
before 2009. First, Universal Health interprets a section of the 
FCA—Section 3279(a)(1)—that did not have an explicit 
materiality requirement before 2009, and, unlike other sections 
of the FCA, still does not have an explicit requirement.106 
Despite the lack of a materiality requirement, the Supreme 
Court had no trouble finding that the FCA’s materiality 
requirement also applied to this section.107 Second, although 
                                              
clear language and congressional intent of the FCA.” S. Rep. 
No. 111-10, at 10. Accordingly, the revised text contained in 
Sections 3729(a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(G) scaled back the more 
strenuous intent requirement created by the Supreme Court in 
Allison Engine, 553 U.S. 662 (2008). See S. Rep. No. 111-10, 
at 12 (“To correct the Allison Engine decision, [the FERA] 
contains three specific changes to existing section 3729(a)(2) 
and (a)(3). In section 3729(a)(2) the words ‘to get’ were 
removed striking the language the Supreme Court found 
created an intent requirement for false claims liability under 
that section. In place of this language, the Committee inserted 
the words ‘material to’ a false or fraudulent claim.”). The 
Senate Report further explained that the newly-added 
definition of “material” was “consistent with the Supreme 
Court definition, as well as other courts interpreting the term 
as applied to the FCA.” Id. (emphasis added). In other words, 
the legislative history explains that courts had previously 
been applying a materiality requirement to FCA claims, and 
these amendments simply (1) made the formerly implicit 
materiality requirement explicit, and (2) provided a standard 
definition of “material.” 
106 Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (1994) (creating liability 
for anyone who “knowingly presents, or causes to be 
presented, to an officer or employee of the United States 
Government or a member of the Armed Forces of the United 
States a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval”), 
with 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2009) (creating liability for 
anyone who “knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a 
false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval”). 
107 Universal Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2002 (discussing “§ 
3729(a)(1)(A)’s materiality requirement”). 
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the 2009 amendments did include a definition of “material,” 
Universal Health held that it “need not decide whether § 
3729(a)(1)(A)’s materiality requirement is governed by § 
3729(b)(4) or derived directly from the common law” because 
both employ the same standard.108 The unavoidable conclusion 
based on the Court’s analysis is that: (1) Section (a)(1) has a 
materiality requirement, even though that requirement has 
never been expressed in the statute, and (2) the standard used 
to measure materiality did not change in 2009 when Congress 
amended the FCA to include a definition of “material.” 
Accordingly, we conclude that the FCA has always included a 
materiality element (and that the 2009 provisions merely made 
this element explicit). We also conclude that the definition of 
“material,” which is derived from the common law and was 
enshrined in the statute itself in 2009, has not changed.109 
 
D. The False Claims Alleged in This Case Were Not 
Material 
 
 The Supreme Court has explained that “if the 
Government regularly pays a particular type of claim in full 
despite actual knowledge that certain requirements were 
violated, and has signaled no change in position, that is strong 
evidence that the requirements are not material.”110 That is 
precisely the situation here. As the District Court succinctly 
concluded:  
The crucial facts underlying the false claims here 
are that (1) CMS was well aware of the difficulty 
many pharmacies and PBMs were having 
                                              
108 Id. 
109 Furthermore, in support of its statement that “[m]ateriality 
. . . cannot be found where noncompliance is minor or 
insubstantial,” the Supreme Court cites to two cases: a 
Supreme Court case from 1943 and a New York Court of 
Appeals case from 1931. 136 S. Ct. at 2003 (citing Marcus v. 
Hess, 317 U.S. at 543; Junius Const. Corp. v. Cohen, 257 
N.Y. 393, 400 (N.Y. 1931)). The 1943 Supreme Court case, 
Marcus v. Hess, dealt specifically with the FCA. 317 U.S. at 
539. This further supports the existence of a materiality 
element in the FCA long before 2009. 
110 Universal Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2003-04. 
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obtaining a proper physician identifier; (2) CMS 
was concerned with filling valid prescriptions 
and did not want claims rejected at the point of 
service for absence of a valid identifier; (3) PDE 
records could not be submitted without some 
type of number that satisfied the requisite 
algorithm in the physician identifier field; (4) 
CMS knew that many PBMs were submitting 
PDEs with dummy numbers in the physician 
identifier field in the 2006 and 2007 time period; 
(5) CMS could easily recognize dummy 
prescriber identifier numbers; and (6) CMS took 
no action to deny payment on such claims during 
the 2006–2007 time period.111 
 
Nevertheless, Spay claims that, because the government 
explicitly advised the parties that the individual CMS 
employees did not speak for CMS and that CMS did not 
endorse their testimony, the testimony of those CMS 
employees cannot be used at summary judgment to establish 
that CMS as an agency knew of and affirmatively authorized a 
general industry use of false prescriber identifiers on PDE 
claims. Although that argument may well preclude reliance on 
the government inference doctrine, it does not undermine our 
belief that the misstatements here were simply not material to 
the government’s decision to pay the claims substantiated by 
the challenged PDEs. The government did not pay for services 
that were not provided, and the Sponsors did not receive any 
compensation for prescriptions that were never given to 
Medicare recipients.  
  
CMS knew that dummy Prescriber IDs were being used 
by PBMs, that it routinely paid PBMs despite the use of these 
dummy Prescriber IDs, and that CMS only “signaled [a] 
change in position” well after 2007.112 Spay does not contest 
                                              
111 Spay, 2015 WL 5582553, at *34. 
112 See Spay, 2015 WL 5582553, at *37–*39 (discussing 
CMS’s post-2007 efforts to prohibit use of dummy identifiers 
and concluding that “[c]onsidered collectively, this evidence 
creates the sole reasonable inference that CMS did not 
previously have a clear prohibition on the use of dummy 
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that CMS employees knew that dummy identifiers were being 
used on PDEs or the reason for using them. Nevertheless, CMS 
paid for those prescriptions. Moreover, CMS can hardly be 
faulted for paying even though it knew the information 
identifying the prescribers was not accurate. CMS was 
concerned with making sure that the medications were 
dispensed to Medicare recipients and that pharmacies were 
paid for those prescriptions. Had the payments stopped, the 
prescriptions would not have been dispensed, and the 
pharmaceutical needs of Medicare recipients would not have 
been addressed. The misstatements that gave rise to this qui 
tam action allowed patients to get their medication, and they 
are precisely the type of “minor or insubstantial” 
misstatements where “[m]ateriality . . . cannot be found.”113 
The Supreme Court has instructed that “[t]he False 
Claims Act is not ‘an all-purpose antifraud statute,’ or a vehicle 
for punishing garden-variety breaches of contract or regulatory 
violations.”114 It is difficult for us to disagree with the District 
Court’s conclusion that, “[a]t base, this case appears to be 
nothing more than an effort to convert an unprofitable private 
audit—performed at a time when Part D regulations were new 
and not as explicit in their instructions—into a successful 
recovery of funds under the guise of a qui tam action.”115 The 
dummy Prescriber IDs were intended as one thing, and one 
thing only: they were intended as a technical, formulaic way of 
preventing a computer program from denying legitimate 
claims for reimbursement and payment for prescriptions that 
were actually disbursed to Medicare recipients. Those 
recipients needed the prescriptions the claims were based on, 
and nothing here suggests that the prescriptions or the 
workaround that prevented legitimate claims for payment from 
being improperly rejected by a computer code served anything 
other than the practical purpose of facilitating that payment and 
disbursement of those prescriptions. The workaround could 
arguably be described as “creative,” or a “common sense 
                                              
identifiers. By first ‘clarifying’ its policies [in 2010], then 
‘revising’ its prior policy and regulation text [in 2011 and 
2012], CMS effectively indicated that, prior to these efforts, 
dummy identifiers were permissible”). 
113 Universal Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2003. 
114 Id. (quoting Allison Engine, 553 U.S. at 672). 
115 Spay, 2015 WL 5582553, at *65. 
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solution” to a very real and perplexing problem. But we see 
nothing that would justify calling it “fraud.” The claims 
themselves were neither false nor fraudulent. Nothing in the 
text or history of the FCA leads us to conclude that Congress 
intended conduct such as this to morph into an actionable fraud 
against the government. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of 
Defendants. 
